The Philosopher is In

DEAR PHILOSOPHER SCOTT: “IS IT POSSIBLE TO BE OBJECTIVE?” – Dave B.

This question can be interpreted in at least two ways. An uncharitable interpretation would cast it as self-contradicting, for a ‘subject’ can only have the subject’s view, and thus never its opposite, i.e., the ‘objects’ view.

It would be more charitable to interpret the question as asking, given that our view is always only from some perspective (or aggregate of perspectives) or other, whether a neutral perspective, or at least a scale for assessing the relative neutrality of perspectives, is possible. Usually, the concern with neutrality is focused on the problem of conflicting ideologies, so the most useful interpretation of this question may be that of whether it is possible to conduct a neutral investigation of ideological questions, such as those about morality, ethics, etiquette, politics or religion.

At stake here is the idea that if it is determinable that ideological ‘objectivity’ with respect to these questions is impossible, then we are faced with a dystopian conclusion that opposing factions cannot be expected to agree on what’s ‘right’ by dignified appeals to objective arguments, and rather, can, at best, only make deals to strike reluctant compromises; never achieving an ideal harmony.

Also at stake is the idea that if ideological neutrality is mythical, then ‘fairness’ is meaningless, and ultimately, when one faction is unhappy with their share in a compromise that the another is content to maintain, the ultimate arbiter is force. Where the might of factions are approximately evenly matched, the result is war; where they are not, the result is oppression and/or exploitation.

Despite most people seeming to believe that moral ideology is ‘objective’, e.g., believing, for example, that it’s definitely ‘wrong’ to steal – in other words, that immoral action is actually objectively ‘bad’, not just bad relative to a cultural context – dystopian administration of force has nevertheless been the historical arbiter of how human civilization is conducted.

So, for those who hope to see something better moving forward, there are significant stakes to the question of whether ideological questions can be approached objectively. However, we would perjure our investigation if we argued from the fallacy of appealing to consequences, i.e., that objective neutrality must be regarded as possible because we don’t like the alternative. Such would be a perfect example of non-objectivity, unaware of itself corrupting the question, lobbying to influence the outcome of an ostensibly ‘objective’ investigation.

Rather, if we wish to think that an objective view of ideology is possible, we’d have to show how one can maintain an objective inquiry into the subjective domain of valuation that, by definition, must do so in a logically consistent manner without questionbegging (Begging the question: Where an investigator’s belief in an interpretation, the validity of which is under investigation, causes them to count ideas dependent on its validity as ‘evidence’ for its validity, e.g., regarding the fact that it says so in the Bible as evidence that the Bible is the word of God).

The more philosophical way to approach this problem is to conduct a prior investigation into whether it is reasonable to believe an ‘objective ideology’ could exist by first specifying exactly what we mean by ‘objective ideology’, and then determining whether this conjunction is not, by definitions of terms, self-contradicting.

Our first problem arises with the fact that ideologies are grounded in a direct prioritization of social value, while ‘objectivity’ (to ideology or anything else), as an ideal, is based in prioritizing (at least temporarily) the exclusive valuation of truth. As such, a contradiction of priorities is implied by the idea of ideology that is objective.

We do not need to reject the entire premise due to this contradiction, when we can instead apply the principle of charity to adjust our understanding of it to the closest non-contradictory meaning it could have.

As one can seek to base their ideologies on objective inquiry, but we know that any resulting ideologies cannot themselves, by definition, be ‘objective’, we may understand that our present question is about the varying degrees of ‘objectivity’ that can be applied to ideological investigations. The question then becomes equivalent to asking whether there are means of avoiding the egregious influence of subjective preferences and cognitive biases in establishing one’s otherwise inherently subjective, values based ideologies.

All categories of thought have a ‘meta-view’, even if some are necessarily recursive. The meta-view is essentially the investigation of the more general categories from which the concept of a subject category is generated. So, for example, there is a subject category, ‘culture’, and there is the discipline that investigates its foundations, i.e., anthropology. It can be said that anthropology, at least in aspiration, is ‘meta-cultural’, i.e., not itself a culture, but the instrument by which the foundations of culture are objectified and analyzed. Likewise, physics is a subject category, with ‘meta-physics’ (not itself within the domain of physics) the area of thought aspiring to objectify and analyze the foundations of physics.

So with regard to ideology, the degree to which a mode of inquiry is ‘meta-ideological’, i.e., does not bias toward, assume or depend on ideological interpretations, will reveal the degree of an investigator’s objectivity.

I propose the following guide using an inquiry into the ethics of theft as the muse.

NON-NEUTRAL (BIASED): ‘Which is more wrong, theft or vandalism?’ (this example is loaded with the ideological assumption that theft and vandalism are ‘wrong’)

LESS BIASED, BUT STILL NOT NEUTRAL: ‘Is it right or wrong to steal?’ (this example assumes that it is either right or wrong to steal – in other words, that stealing must have an ethical valence of one type or another, and leads by asking for our opinion, not our arguments supporting it.)

CLOSER TO NEUTRAL: ‘What criteria are reasonable to use in determining whether theft should be considered right or wrong?’ (this example, like the preceding, implies that stealing must have ethical valence, but improves on the preceding by demanding not just an opinion, but the criteria for opining reasonably).

STILL CLOSER TO NEUTRAL: ‘Since theft exists as a byproduct of the idea of actual or implied title to property, should an enforced system of property title be considered at least partially, if not entirely, the source of ethical problems that emerge from it?’ (This example broadens the context, which means it doesn’t ignore contextual factors that simpler opinions usually do, but it still asserts an ideological values-bias in implying that some ethical juxtapositions are ‘problems’.)

CLOSEST TO NEUTRAL (OF THIS GROUP): ‘Are property rights violations specific to the rules of a game by which some of us agree to play (while forcing others to play by them, whether they agree or not); and if so, when those not agreeing don’t capitulate, is it reasonable to condemn them as anti-ethical by the rules of our property rights game which they didn’t agree to?’ (our context in this example may be as abstract as  possible without causing the idea of ethics, as a concept, to dissolve into meaninglessness.)

In response to your question, it is the degree of abstracting immediately preceding that at which a concept loses its primary grounding category, that the potential for an investigation to render the most objective view of a subjective category (such as ideology) is possible. The next abstraction, which causes dissolution of the subject category, may be said to be more ‘objective’, but as it fails to include a view of the subjective topic at hand, it cannot be included among manners of addressing it.

The series on concept will continue next week.

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